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Abstract The Chinese Room Argument purports to show that‘ syntax is
not sufficient for semantics’; an argument which led John Searle to conclude
that ‘programs are not minds’ and hence that no computational device can
ever exhibit true understanding. Yet, although this controversial argument
has received a series of criticisms, it has withstood all attempts at decisive
rebuttal so far. One of the classical responses to CRA has been based on
equipping a purely computational device with a physical robot body. This
response, although partially addressed in one of Searle’s original contra argu-
ments - the ‘robot reply’ - more recently gained friction with the development
of embodiment and enactivism1, two novel approaches to cognitive science
that have been exciting roboticists and philosophers alike. Furthermore, re-
cent technological advances - blending biological beings with computational
systems - have started to be developed which superficially suggest that mind
may be instantiated in computing devices after all. This paper will argue that
(a) embodiment alone does not provide any leverage for cognitive robotics
wrt the CRA, when based on a weak form of embodiment and that (b) unless
they take the body into account seriously, hybrid bio-computer devices will
also share the fate of their disembodied or robotic predecessors in failing to
escape from Searle’s Chinese room.
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1 In this work the term enactivism will be used to delineate theoretical approaches
to cognition that emphasise perception as action encompassing, for example, Gibson’s
‘ecological approach’; Varela et al’s ‘embodied mind’; No¨e’s ‘action as perception’ and
O’Regan and No¨e’s ‘sensorimotor account of vision’.
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1 Introduction
In his 1980 paper Minds, Brains and Programs (MBP)[46] John Searle for-
mulated his influential Chinese Room Argument (CRA) aimed at refuting
the possibility of achieving the holy grail of Artificial Intelligence2, what he
termed ‘Strong-AI’: that is, creating a truly intelligent computational device;
instantiating mind in machine.
In spite of the controversy it generated, CRA remains a hallmark argu-
ment in the debate over the possibility of instantiating mind in computing
devices. In its most basic form, it addresses the most radical version of the
claim as proposed by good old fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI)3.
Nonetheless many scholars do not agree that the CRA succeeds or at least
try to suggest frameworks which could circumvent its conclusions. One such
area purported to escape the CRA argument is ‘cognitive robotics’. The hope
of its proponents is that by providing a physical body, computational opera-
tions are married to cognitive processes via embodiment and enactivism, and
by virtue of the latter the CRA argument fails to apply.
This paper will briefly introduce the original argument and will argue that
in its current form, cognitive robotics is more aligned with a particular form
of enactivism (weak enactivism) which does not seem to offer a way out of
Chinese Room.
Furthermore, there has been a nascent field of hybrid systems which blend
artificial and biological systems. The question can then be extended to such
hybrids: some forms of which perhaps might circumvent the CRA.
The paper will review such developments and will consider them from this
perspective.
2 Chinese Room Argument
The CRA has been considered one of the most influential arguments in the
history of philosophy of mind achieving at the same time a status of notoriety
amongst the proponents of AI who aimed but failed to quash it with various
counter-arguments[10][45].
In a thought experiment John Searle - who can only speak English - is
locked in a room and communicates with external interlocutors via messages
written on paper4. Searle has a rule-book with instructions in English for
2 The Dartmouth Proposal, “Every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence
can be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it”,[30].
3 From Newel & Simon (1976), ’a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient
means for ’general intelligent action’ ’.
4 NB. In this work we deploy an extended form of the CRA; in the original version
interlocutors merely pose [Chinese] questions about a given story [also in Chinese], which
Searle, using his rule-book, responds to appropriately.
Of (zombie) mice and animats 3
manipulating strings of [Chinese] symbols received as input and subsequently
formulating an output string of symbols, such that the characters appear
to the interlocutors to be linguistic responses in Chinese; in this manner
communication is achieved via appropriate exchange of Chinese ideographs.
Yet, in spite of being able to converse with the Chinese interlocutors in a
way that for all purposes appear to them as if he can understand Chinese,
Searle proposed that in fact he does not understand a word of Chinese, no
matter how skilful his manipulations of the Chinese symbols is.
The CRA was intended to show that computers may one day become
skilful enough to appear to process language in a meaningful way by using
only syntactic manipulation, however by this process they remain incapable
by themselves of giving rise to meaning or semantics.
Thus the Chinese Room Argument challenges functionalism and compu-
tational theory of mind. The latter proposes that mental states are simply
computational states which are implementation-independent. As such, they
can be instantiated in a computational device by mere symbol manipulation.
Although John Searle did not dismiss the possibility that machines could
possess intentionality and true understanding (indeed he specifically identi-
fied humans as such ‘biological machines’), he did not believe these qualities
could come about by sheer computational symbol manipulation alone.
2.1 Intentionality in computational systems?
A number of arguments have been put forward against the CRA, some of
which had already been anticipated by Searle in the original paper[46]. These
counter proposals can be categorised into groups purporting to refute CRA
on different grounds. Various forms of systems replies try to argue that un-
derstanding is not a property of Searle alone, but of the entire system. What
that system should be is the subject of particular variants of the systems
reply.
Some variants of the System reply posit to give rise to true understanding
the system must be effectively implementing a simulation of a brain (or at
the very least, be imply,enter via some kind of connectionist architecture).
Detailed taxonomies of different replies to the CRA together with rebuttals
have been presented elsewhere[10, 45, 46]. Instead of providing yet another
one here, we wish to focus on a specific kind of systems reply, the so called
‘robot reply’, which although considered in the original paper by Searle, has
more recently gained particular momentum thanks to the links between cog-
nitive robotics and a new move in cognitive science called enactivism[32, 41].
The robot reply proposes that true understanding must arise from ground-
ing of meaning in the physical world and hence that the system must en-
able such grounding to take place. This is to be achieved by an appropriate
rule-book enabling the robot to implement the ‘right type of manipulations’
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and concomitant sensory motor coupling afforded by the robot’s interactions
with the external world. It is claimed that such an extended system (robot
plus appropriate computational mechanism; the latter often proposed to be
a connectionist architecture or brain simulation) can fulfil the necessary and
sufficient conditions for meaning and understanding to arise.
However, as previously mentioned, the initial extensions of the basic CRA
discussed by Searle in the original paper[46] explicitly addressed such a
’Robot reply’ which Searle claims buys nothing, for the CRA could easily be
extended by providing additional input in the form of symbolic values cor-
responding to camera and other sensory readings; the outputs strings Searle
now produces encompassing both the robots verbal responses [in Chinese]
and symbolic commands to manipulate (unbeknownst to Searle in CRA)
the external objects by the robot’s actuators. Such an extension would only
require a more complicated rule-book; the extra syntactic inputs and dif-
ferent forms of response would continue to afford no real understanding if
it were not there in the first place. In accord with Searle’s response to the
Robot reply, we similarly conclude that if we were to attribute genuine men-
tal states/intentionality to such a computationally driven robotic device, we
would also be obliged to do so also for any modern car equipped with elec-
tronic sensors and computer.
3 Robotic reply and enactivism
A very refreshing movement within cognitive science has gradually been
emerging which rejects the computationalist view of cognition in favour of
enactivism[53]. Enactivism emphasises the importance of embodiment and
action in cognition and proposes that the most fundamental notion is that of
embodied autonomy, which superficially at least offers renewed fundamental
justification to cognitive robotics as a useful tool able to address the most
fundamental questions about cognition and understanding.
Cognitive robotics itself could be viewed as a departure from the disem-
bodied good old fashioned AI (GOFAI) as it also considers that embodiment
is fundamental for cognition to arise. Moreover, various forms of cognitive
robotic stress to a different degree the importance of embodiment for cog-
nition, with some placing more emphasis on the actual body and its affor-
dancies, than on the nitty gritty of the central ’computational’ processing
unit[43, 44]. In fact, this modern successor of GOFAI has been proposed to
provide a fertile experimental ground for cognitive science[32]. Considered to
be a radical departure from GOFAI by its enthusiasts, it has found itself in
mutually beneficial symbiosis with some forms of enactivism[29, 41]. At first
sight it thus seems that such an alliance may be able to provide a rebuttal
to CRA on theoretical grounds.
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3.1 Does cognitive robotics escape the CRA?
In order to answer the above question it is important to emphasise that
there are many interpretations of enactivism5 and that cognitive robotics is
particularly aligned with versions that emphasise the role of sensori-motor
couplings[37]:
our ability to perceive not only depends on, but is constituted by, our possession
of ... sensorimotor knowledge
at the same time eschewing Varelian enactivism in which fundamental
autonomy stems from the organisational closure of living systems[2]:
it is somehow intuitive that cognition relates to sensorimotor interactions rather
than to material self-constructing processes.
This form of enactivism embraces Gibbsonian affordances and moreover
proposes that the experienced qualities[37]
pattern[s] in the structure of sensorimotor contingenc[ies]
are sensori-motor laws[40, 41]. As No¨e put it[37]:
for perceptual sensation to constitute experience, that is, for it to have genuine
representational content, the perceiver must possess and make use of sensorimotor
knowledge.
Although we agree that sensorimotor interactions are important for cogni-
tion, the move away from the organisational closure proposed by Barandiaran
and Moreno[2]:
... as well as being somewhat awkward for cognitive robotics (since it would imply
that no genuine cognitive behaviour can be expected from non-self-constructing
artifacts) this thesis [that autopoiesis is necessary for cognition] is also conceptu-
ally uncomfortable
appears to us unjustified; for the above sentiment seems to be based on
either expediency and handpicking the elements of enactive theory that suit
a particular style of robotic approaches to cognition, or on confusion be-
tween organisational closure and autopoiesis. However, although the latter
two notions seem intimately linked - with the notion of autopoiesis being
the minimal organisation of the (unicellular) living systems - organisational
closure is broader as it characterises further autonomous systems such as
multi-cellular organisms as well as the nervous or even the social systems[18].
Nevertheless, in spite of the convenience of such an argument for current
cognitive robotics, the concentration of the sensorimotor account solely on
5 Our discussion specifically addresses the particular interpretation of sensory motor
account derived from early works of No¨e and O’Regan on this subject, which seems to
have been adopted within cognitive robotics community[29, 32, 43, 44]. It is important
to note though that both authors have since developed their accounts in separate and
increasingly divergent directions[38, 42].
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the external world - with the reduction of the role of the body to mere
instantiation of appropriate sensory motor couplings and disregard for the
material self-constructing processes which also constitute the integral part of
the body - does not seem to to us to afford any extra mileage over and above
the original robot reply considered by Searle in MBP.
Conversely, we suggest that as long as efforts within cognitive robotics
are directed only towards grounding meaning in the external world - whilst
neglecting the need for concomitant grounding in internal states - all devices
so constructed can ever hope to achieve are merely ever more sophisticated
reflections of the relational structure of the external world in the relational
structure of their internal [formal] representations, with fundamentally no
account of either ‘raw feel’ or the genuine understanding of anything.
To illustrate this consider how Searle - merely deploying the CRA rule-
book inside the Chinese room - could ever answer the following question
(posed, of course, in Chinese), “Are you hungry?”. We suggest that there is
a fundamental difference between Searle’s ability to answer questions of this
form, with his ability to ‘converse’ about the relationships between objects
external to the Chinese Room. In the latter case the rule-book, augmented
by any of Searle’s own contemporaneous notes6, may enable him to identify
symbol associations and appropriate manipulations without actually entail-
ing any understanding on his part. In this sense he indeed would be acting
(perhaps with the help of a pen and paper) as an expert system or a neu-
ral network - making associations between the symbols and the frequencies
of their co-occurrences. A neural network can capture such associations be-
tween objects by tweaking its internal weights - albeit this is a mechanistic
operation, itself devoid of meaning (i.e. ungrounded).
In fact, the above observation applies whether or not one considers ‘the
classical Chinese Room Argument’ or the embodied (robot-reply) version as
long as the embodiment is merely intended to provide sensory motor coupling
in the sense of extra information about the possible manipulations various
objects entail. This is why the Chinese Room Argument enables Searle to
make reasonable responses as long as his queries are exclusively about the
external world; the Chinese room can algorithmically capture such ‘semantic
webs’, as this is essentially merely a statistical problem - computers already
can do this.
Internalising the entire Chinese room7 as in Searle’s initial response to
the systems reply to the CRA will not help either, as long as Searle is not
allowed to interact with the external world directly (i.e. without the veil of
the formal CRA rule-book) for, in this case, Searle would immediately start
forming mappings between his own internal meanings and the new symbols
6 Such ‘notes’ may define ‘internal representations’ that, for example, might highlight
specific associations between strings of symbols.
7 I.e. Searle memorises the rule-book, his notes etc. and subsequently performing all
operations in memory such that there is nothing in the system that is not now inside
Searle.
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and their associations (this is exactly how we learn any foreign language).
Meaning would therefore be transferred by association to the new symbols,
which by themselves do not originally carry any meaning (to a non Chinese
speaker).
Similarly, the question of whether a symbolic computational, sub-symbolic
connectionist, or continuous dynamical system approach should be adopted
translates into the question of formal richness of the internal relational uni-
verse or the mathematical nature of the mapping between external and in-
ternal relational spaces. Although there are very important considerations
delineating some key properties of cognitive states, they pertain ’only’ to
necessary aspects of intentionality related to the nature of regularities in the
external world (continuous and statistical or symbolic and recursive) and the
best formal means to extract and manipulate them; they do not reference,
and remain ungrounded in Searle’s own internal bodily states. As various
CRA variants elaborate, the precise nature of operations needed for the con-
struction of internal representations (or means by which a mapping between
external and internal relational structures is achieved) is irrelevant.
Some cognitive roboticists concede that current robotic platforms have
been too impoverished in terms of their sensory surface to provide proper
embodiment, but they insist that it is merely a matter of providing robots
with more sensors in order to achieve genuine intentional states. However,
adding more sensors (e.g. touch, proprioception) and actuators does not buy
anything apart from larger rule-books, vectors to correlate or look-up tables.
The above considerations, important as they are, are clearly insufficient to
fully ground intentional states as, for example, Searle in CRA would painfully
become aware if the CRA experiment was ever actually conducted by cynical
interrogators. The demonstration would be very simple, if cruel, as all that
would be needed is to lock the door of the Chinese room and wait; soon
enough, as the monoglot Searle remains unable to communicate his bodily
needs to the outside world in Chinese, the CRA (or Searle to be precise)
would be no more8.
This is because the rule-book details purely formal associations between
uninterpreted symbols. No amount of codifying associations and frequencies
of co-occurrences between symbols relating to the external world will help
Searle in the Chinese room communicate his internal states and desires, or to
answer questions that inherently call for reference to the internal state of the
‘system’ (of which Searle is a part). E.g. questions such as :- ‘do you believe
this story to be true?’, ‘do you like this story?’, ‘how does this story make
you feel?’, etc. Any of the associations the rule-book could be permitted to
codify (that Searle could try to use to answer such questions) will, ex hypoth-
8 Searle, being unable to communicate his basic bodily requirements for food and water
to his interrogators outside there room, would quickly die.
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esi, relate only to external objects and hence will remain mere third person
observations; none can ever detail appropriate first person associations9.
Ironically, the inability of Searle (in the CRA system) to communicate his
own internal states can be contrasted with his perfect ability, ex hypothesi,
to communicate about the internal states of Chinese interlocutors; they are
mere external states to him after all.
The strict sensorimotor account - and hence much of modern cognitive
robotics - for all their claims of radical departures from computational-
ism/GOFAI, seem to invoke a parallel move to the implementation invariance
of the latter approaches; this time a hardware implementation invariance,
which in effect states that details of different embodiments do not matter
as long as they afford the same sensory motor contingencies. The latter,
though are assumed to amount to appropriate causal relationships between
possible manipulations or actions (how the sensation changes in response to
object manipulation) and sensations (how the objects ‘feels’). However, be-
cause body can be memoryless, invoking hardware invariance principle, the
sensory motor laws must amount to appropriate co-occurrences of activations
of appropriate parts of the nervous system.
Although the sensory motor account seems intuitive and appealing in its
emphasis of the fact that we understand by being in the world and acting
upon it, nevertheless its account rests on some special role or properties that
motor actions must have when leading to perception of their outcome. Why
’a pattern in the structure of sensorimotor contingencies’[37] is any different
from patterns in sensory data? After all, both must result in (and only in)
respective concomitant patterns of activity of neurons in appropriate brain
structures.
If, rather than talking about sensory motor coupling we substitute an-
other sense for acting - we also get co-occurrences and it is not easy to
see why this would lead to fundamentally lesser (rather than simply dif-
ferent) understanding than sensory-motor coupling. At the end of the day
whether it is sensory-motor or sensory-sensory coupling, both correspond to
patterns of neural activations co-occurring in a coordinated manner in the
brain and there is nothing in the sensory motor account that explains why
co-occurrences between sensory-motor neural activities should assume such
special role.10
The other possibility is that either hardware implementation invariance
is violated (the body does count) or there is more to sensory motor laws
9 Note that the original CRA argument is about Searle answering questions about a
story; the questions we provide above are merely illustrations of the inherent limitation
of CRA system that could be gleaned by more Searle-sympathetic interrogators.
10 Interestingly, that the co-occurrences in the form of correlations (actually sensory-
sensory correlations sic!) are indeed important is illustrated by the rubber hand illusion,
in which subjects, when presented with a rubber hand in appropriate position in their
field of view and observing how that hand is stroked simultaneously with their own
(hidden) hand, report feel that the rubber hand is their own[5].
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than action-sensation associations. Whichever is the case, both alternatives
seem to point to the same conclusion, the extra “ingredients” present must be
related to the biological makeup of the organism. At the most fundamental
level, these will be bio-physico-chemical properties of the body (including the
nervous system) induced by motor actions and sensory activations; metabolic
properties of its constituents at all levels (as we can talk about metabolic
needs of the entire organism, of its components - eg the brain but also about
metabolic properties of individual components - the cells).
Consistently with Varelian forms of eanactivism[18, 38], true intentionality
can only arise in systems which ground meaning jointly - respecting exter-
nal constraints as well as internal states - a situation which, as the CRA
illustrates, is impossible to achieve by a computational (or in fact any mech-
anistic/formal) system as they have no such physiological states at all.
What is closely related is that even though formal systems (even those
instantiated in a robotic device) may be in principle rich enough to reflect the
complexity of the relational structure of the external world, there is nothing
in their constituent structures that will make them do so; or do anything
at all for that matter. This is because of their very nature - abstraction of
any mechanistic rule or formalism from any system that instantiates it. For
example what the symbolic operations are should be invariant to the means by
which they are accomplished. Thus, there is nothing that inherently compels
an artificial agent to do anything, to perform any form of formal manipulation
that could help it to map out the regularities of the external world. Turing-
machine based robotic systems can at best, using Dennett’s phraseology,
instantiate ‘as-if’ autonomy and teleology; in reality merely reflecting their
designers wishes and goals.
In contrast, real cognitive agents have internal drives at all levels of organ-
isation - survival, metabolic and physical - that make them act in the world,
make them react to the external disturbances (information) and manipulate it
in such a way that they will support immediate and delayed fulfilment of the
drives at all levels. Such manipulation of information is effectively intentional
as it is tantamount to the biological, biochemical and biophysical changes of
real cognitive agents’ biological constituents, which are intrinsically grounded
(they have metabolic, physiologic and ultimately survival values).
The intentionality comes not only from the potential mapping between
the relational structures of the external world and the states of the biologi-
cal constituents; but also appears as a result of external disturbances (which
under such mapping correspond to information manipulation) which are also
intrinsically grounded as they follow real physical laws and do not come about
merely for the symbol manipulation’s sake. Systems which are based only on
formal manipulation of the internal representations are thus neither inten-
tional nor autonomous (as no manipulation is internally driven nor serves an
intrinsically meaningful purpose other than that of system designer’s).
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4 Modern embodiments
But the story does not end with robotic systems controlled by Turing-
machines alone. In the recent years, huge strides have been made in advancing
hybrid systems. These devices are robotic machines with both an active neu-
robiological and artificial (e.g. electronic, mechanical or robotic) components.
Such devices start to blur the divide between the artificial and the biological.
In particular, systems integrating artifacts with the nervous system may offer
interesting avenues to explore new potential counter arguments to the CRA.
Indeed, there has been a long history of attempts to create interfaces be-
tween artefacts and the motor system, in the form of prostheses[34]. Inter-
faces with the sensory modalities include cochlear implants for improving
hearing[4], as well as retinal implants, which recently have been shown to be
capable, in principle, to enable reading to their users[17, 57].
Great strides made in implant technology advanced it beyond augment-
ing sensory modalities towards interfacing directly with the brain, with deep
brain stimulation being one of the clinically approved treatments for some
neurological disorders[16, 25]. Recent animal studies have successfully demon-
strated possibility of creating implant replacing deep brain structure such as
hippocampus for restoring existing memories[3].
In the above case the implant was trained on data recorded from the hip-
pocampus of an animal previously trained on a spatial memory task. When
subsequently the hippocampus was inactivated, the animal showed impair-
ments on the same task, whereas the behavioural measures of task perfor-
mance were restored, once the hippocampal input/output function has been
replaced by the implant.
Other studies have demonstrated that implant devices could be used to lay
down new associations, as was the case for classical conditioning of rats with
synthetic cerebellum implants[31]. Rats with inactivated cerebella shown no
ability to learn new classical conditioning responses, whereas in animals in
which the input output functions of cerebella have been replaced by implants
created to mimic them, the rats recovered ability to learn new classically
conditioned responses.
Brain Machine Interfaces (BMIs) open new communication channels by
allowing direct interface between the brain structures (typically cortex) and
external devices, and may afford a seamless interface with prostheses[24, 27,
33, 36, 54]. Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) strive to achieve similar aims by
less invasive means (typically using noninvasive EEG signals), thus extending
the range of potential applications beyond the clinical realm[7, 12, 26].
Finally, animats - robotic embodiments of neural cultures grown in vitro -
allow for investigation of the biological neuronal networks underlying sensory
processing, motor control, and sensory motor loops[14, 28, 39, 55].
Given such considerable advances, it then becomes a very pertinent ques-
tion to enquire whether some form of bio-machine hybrids could achieve what
does not seem to be in the grasp of the conventional cognitive robotics. That
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is, whether a suitable combination of a computationally driven robotic de-
vice with a biological body can achieve a true understanding denied to its
electromechanical, Turing-machine driven, cousins by the CRA.
In order to entertain such a possibility it is important though to delineate
which of the types of systems outlined above might be good candidates for
such consideration. It seems clear that such systems divide along the fault-
line defined by “who is in charge” - they can be either ‘sentient being’ - driven
(these include prostheses, implants, BMI, BCI), or driven by ‘formal systems’.
Extant animats fall into the latter category.
Of the hybrid advancements, the ones where the overall control of the
system rests with the sentient agent are not really addressing the problem
at hand. This is because any form of understanding claimed by the hybrid
system would quite clearly be enabled via bootstrapping the sentient being’s
‘understanding’. Conversely the problem we wish to consider is whether a
formal system with a form of biological embodiment that is not afforded by
standard and recent cognitive robotics systems circumvents the CRA objec-
tions. It thus follows that out of the advancements overviewed above the
animats provide a platform that is a serious contender for such a position.
4.1 Animats
Recently, one of the co-authors, with a team from University of Reading,
developed an autonomous robot (aka ‘animat’) controlled by cultures of living
neural cells, which in turn are directly coupled to the robot’s actuators and
sensory inputs[56]. Such devices come a step closer to the physical realisation
of the well known ’brain in a vat’ thought experiment11.
The ‘brain’ of the system consisted of a cultured network of thousands of
neurons. The cultures are created by first removing any existing structure
from cortical tissue of foetal rats and then seeding the resulting suspension
containing neuron bodies on a plate and providing suitable nutrients. The
plate has an array of 8x8 electrodes embedded at the base (a multi-electrode
array (MEA)), which provide a bi-directional electrical interface to the cul-
tures via appropriate hardware.
Within a short time after seeding, the neurons spontaneously begin to form
new connections between each other and henceforth start engaging in com-
munication. Given the right culture medium containing nutrients, growth
hormones, and antibiotics, a culture tends to develop within a day into a
monolayer with a dense network of connections, and within a week it starts
to produce spontaneous activity in the form of single action potentials. The
activity intensifies over the subsequent weeks developing into bursts of activ-
11 For movie of an animat see www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-0eZytv6Qk
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ity across the entire culture, which continue until culture maturation (ca 1
month since seeding).
Thus, MEAs allow for monitoring of an electrical activity of entire cultures
as well as for their electrical stimulation via electrodes. This ability of bi-
directional communication enabled creation of closed-loop systems between
physical, and simulated, mobile robotic platforms and cultured networks. At
Reading we used an off the shelf robotic platform (Miabot; Merlin Robotics,
UK), because of its simplicity, accuracy of motor command encoding and
speeds suitable for movement in an enclosed, custom built robot pen.
The created system was modular and consisted of several hardware and
software modules including a robot (hardware or simulation), an MEA and
its recording and stimulation hardware and software, a computer worksta-
tion for conducting on the fly machine learning analysis of recorded culture
activity and extracting pertinent features of neural activity, another worksta-
tion for controlling the robot and delivering commands to robot actuators.
The resulting signals from the robot ultrasonic sensors were translated into
stimulation signals received by the culture and all the different modules were
linked into an overall closed-loop system via a TCP/IP protocol.
Cultures used in our studies consisted of tens of thousands of neurons and
showed complex, seemingly random pattern of connectivity and resulting ac-
tivity. However, further study of the activity of our cultures has demonstrated
functional basic excitatory (glutamate) and inhibitory (GABA) synapses,
whose effect on the culture activity was consistent with that observed in vivo.
Moreover, we also observed the presence of functional cholinergic synapses,
both nicotinic and muscarinic, as well as presence of cholinergic neurons[21].
Both effects and developmental changes of such cholinergic system have been
consistent with those reported in in vivo studies.
In an intact brain cholinergic input from subcortical structures innervates
diffusively cerebral mantle. Combined with the very specific positioning of
cholinergic synapses in local cortical circuitry, this results in coordinated
changes in the mode of activity of the cortex in response to changes in the
concentration of acetylcholine. This is one of the reasons why the choliner-
gic system has been implicated by many neuroscientists in such important
cognitive functions as working memory, learning and attention[8, 22, 23].
The presence of functional cholinergic system in our cultures suggests that,
in principle, they posses the biophysical capacity to support such cognitive
functions in suitably embedded cultures.
This is further corroborated by studies of the functional organisation of
cultures from our laboratory, as well as those obtained at Steve Potter’s lab at
Georgia Tech. These results show the development of functional connectivity
from initially random to one exhibiting hallmarks of ‘small world’ networks,
similarly to the functional connectivity observed in cortical networks[15, 48].
As functional connectivity is believed to reflect the organisation of a complex
system, such as the brain, in ways mirroring its computational properties[49],
such similarity indicates that functionally the cultures have the potential to
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support a range of information processing tasks performed by the cortex in
vivo. Similarly, the presence of metastable states, which we have identified
in such cultures, have been widely suggested, on the basis of numerous an-
imal experiments, to support cognitive processing ranging from perceptual
differentiation, through working memory[58].
Although, consistently with other groups doing research on animats, our
platform - analogous to a simple Braitenberg vehicle - has shown relatively
simple behaviours in the form of obstacle avoidance[56], nevertheless, in terms
of complexity, including the number of neurons, their functional connectivity,
their computational and biophysical properties etc., showed the capacity for
supporting information processing functions observed in intact brains.
Moreover, cultured networks analogous to ours have been shown to re-
spond to open loop conditioning, suggesting that the biological mechanisms
present in them can also support plasticity and learning[28, 47]. One of the
most interesting of such experiments was performed by Steve Potter’s group,
which performed a closed loop conditioning of an animat, in which the choice
of stimulation patterns was a function of animat behaviour gradually leading
to the animat settling on a desired behaviour, (following prespecified direc-
tion in this case[1]). This demonstrates that, in principle, such closed loop
conditioning can be used to achieve any form of association and henceforth
can be incorporated in training an animat to perform much more complex
tasks.
Given the above results obtained in ours and other labs, it is not so ob-
vious that the potential of ’animat’ devices (for example, to behave with all
the flexibility and insight of intelligent natural systems) is as constrained by
the standard a priori arguments purporting to limit the power of (the merely
Turing machine controlled) robots highlighted earlier. Surely, animats go way
beyond conventional robots controlled by computers (i.e. virtually all cogni-
tive robotic systems of today) if not yet in computational or behavioural
sophistication, then certainly in their hybrid mechano-biological makeup and
non-computational capacity.
Because the tasks the animats perform are actually achieved by embodied
’biological nervous system’, they appear to be the best candidates to assuage
the concerns of those who, in words of Andy Clark, “... fear that the embodied
mind is just the disembodied mind with wheels on”[9]. It seems feasible that
as the animat system grows in complexity and their performance becomes
more autonomous and sophisticated, the powers of the embodied neural sys-
tems will eventually allow them to achieve some form of intentional behaviour,
acquiring them status of sentient beings along the way. In particular, forms
of closed loop conditioning, such as demonstrated in[1], could be used to
train the animat such that the culture would produce patterns of activity
that would amount to appropriate manipulation of Chinese symbols, if such
were presented to the appropriate sensors. The resultant neural activity could
easily be mapped back onto appropriate animat responses, as if the system
could answer questions in Chinese with understanding.
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5 Zombie rodent - an ultimate embodiment
In spite of the animat’s obvious advance on completely lifeless robotic sys-
tems, the first objection to a specter of a sentient animat could be levelled
using recent arguments from the enactivist camp. In a paper from 2011, Cos-
melli and Thompson have discussed at great lengths the limitations of ’brain
in a vat’ setting[11],
Suppose that a team of neurosurgeons and bioengineers were able to remove your
brain from your body, suspend it in a life-sustaining vat of liquid nutrients, and
connect its neurons and nerve terminals by wires to a supercomputer that would
stimulate it with electrical impulses exactly like those it normally receives when
embodied.
Although their imagined setup differed from an animat in that the brain
in their gedankenexperiment has been embodied virtually in a simulation by
a supercomputer providing appropriate inputs, nevertheless in congruence
with the thought experiment an animat also enjoys the presence of biolog-
ical nervous system and a compatible ‘envatment’. Nevertheless we believe
that even such systems cannot really possess intentionality for two primary
reasons. First, the objections raised by Cosmelli and Thompson with respect
to their thought experiment envatment apply equally to the robotic embod-
iment present in animat. This is because an animat, with all the standard
robotic embodiment augmented by the MEA experimental hardware geared
towards providing cultures with environment appropriate for their long term
survival and function, amounts more to Cosmelli’s and Thompson envatment
than true embodiment. For the envatment to count as a true embodiment it,
in their own words,
.. would need to be a surrogate body subject to control by the brain. By ’body’
we mean a self-regulating system comprising its own internal, homeodynamic pro-
cesses and capable of of sensorimotor coupling with the outside world.
We agree with Cosmelli and Thompson that, in spite of the superior-
ity of the physical embodiment over simulation, which parallels the differ-
ence between simulated and physical robots emphatically stressed by all self-
respecting roboticists, even animat embodiment is too impoverished to pro-
vide anything more than some form of sensory motor coupling which, as we
tried to argue consistently with Cosmelli and Thompson, seems necessary
but not sufficient to account for intentional states.
Second, we will argue in the reminder of this section that the lack of a
proper embodiment is only a part of the problem; the other equally impor-
tant deficiency of animats is the mechanistic implementation of their condi-
tioning; as long as the processing is following externally imposed constraints,
which are arbitrary from the perspective of ’the brains’ biology, there is little
chance of the system developing true intentionality. This line of argument will
ultimately extend the power of the Chinese Room argument towards prop-
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erly embodied systems, which nevertheless base their functioning on formal
mechanistic and externally driven operations.
The implant technology has advanced beyond creating artificial augmen-
tation of sensory or even cognitive systems. The scientists have tapped into
the biological structures in order to induce in the intact living animals spe-
cific desired behaviours. These developments offer the possibility of using
the operant conditioning and inducing the behaviours in a way analogous to
robotic systems, in animals with an otherwise fully intact body. From the
perspective of our discussion, this offers a possibility of creating an ultimate
embodiment - a system with fully functional biological body, equipped with
functional brain and the normal sensory motor coupling, which nevertheless
could be driven [via suitable conditioning] to perform specified associations
(e.g. Turing style symbol manipulations).
For example, John Chapin and his group inserted an electrode in the
medial forebrain bundle (MBF) in a rat’s brain[51]. The MBF is believed
to be involved in a biological reward system and in generation of pleasur-
able feelings, which is corroborated by behavioural animal intracranial self-
stimulation (ICSS) studies, as well as human subjects reports. Other elec-
trodes were inserted in cortical areas processing information arriving from
animal’s whiskers. This setup enabled Chapin’s group to use operant condi-
tioning in order to train the rat to respond with appropriate turns to stimu-
lation of corresponding whisker areas.
Several days of training taught the animal to start turning according to
remote signals without the MFB stimulation, as a remotely controlled robot
would. The animals could be steered to navigate through different environ-
ments12 or perform even more complex tasks, such as climbing, although they
would not perform tasks which they perceived as ‘dangerous’.
The fundamental condition for the success of such training is that for it to
work, the experimenter must treat the animal as a sentient being - he must
employ the natural desires and goal seeking of an autonomous biological agent
and must do so by tapping into the biological machinery responsible for such
behaviours. Another, equally important, condition for the success is that in
order for the animal to want to follow the training (for the conditioning to
take place), it must be able to discriminate consciously the options so that
it can form the associations between the target options and reward.
These conditions may seem limiting from the perspective of our discussion
on, both, fundamental and pragmatic grounds. First and foremost, employing
an existing sentient being’s teleological behaviour and conscious discrimina-
tion creates the dangerous possibility that the animal could learn to map the
imposed associations on its own intentional interpretations and hence could
bootstrap its own (rat-level) intentionality onto the formal Turing style sym-
bol manipulation artificially imposed on it. Secondly and more pragmatically,
electrodes do not provide sufficient discrimination in delivering stimuli to the
12 See movie of a guided robot at www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5u2IWFNFDE
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appropriate targets, hence the possibility of generating complex conditioning
responses and rich patterns of co-activations that may be necessary for even
the most rudimentary forms of cognition might not be possible using such
technologies.
However, in recent years, an exciting technique called optogenetics has
come to the fore. Optogenetics can provide a sublimely refined levels of con-
trol of brain microcircuitry and can henceforth address, at least in principle,
both caveats. Optogenetics is in a broad sense a combination of optics, ge-
netics and molecular neuroscience[13]. It uses viral vectors in order to target
specific neuron types and make them express light-sensitive proteins identi-
fied in algae or bacteria. As these ’opsins’ act as ion pumps or channels when
activated by light of specific wavelengths, neurons that express them can be
specifically and temporally precisely activated or inhibited by laser.
Using optogenetic technology it is possible to make different cell types ex-
press different opsins and hence to induce a very precise spatial and temporal
patterns of activations and inhibition in the treated tissue. Optogenetics of-
fers the level of spatiotemporal control of manipulation of neural networks
activity both in vitro and in vivo not afforded by traditional chemical or even
electric stimulation, thus it presents the possibility to probe, and also to con-
trol very precisely, individual targets in order to investigate and manipulate
their function.
Such technology was used in a recent study that demonstrated possibility
to perform operant conditioning on a mouse. When the animal, expressing ac-
tivating opsin in parts of the brain involved in reward system (amygdala and
the nucleus accumbens), performed a target ecologically neutral response,
the researchers shone light into its brain, activating neurons, axons of which
formed the path between the two brain regions,[50]. In those animals in which
they transfected the same pathway with opsins that would block the activ-
ity in response to light, scientists were also able to use light to stop mice
exhibiting a previously conditioned response to a relevant cue.
Although their scientific objectives and experimental technologies were
quite different, the experiments performed in[50, 51] both obtained desired
responses tapping into a creatures volitional systems, effectively manufactur-
ing wilful behaviours consistent with those required by the experimenters.
Thus, although both - from our perspective - are subject to the first limiting
condition mentioned above, however the experiments performed by Stuber
and his colleagues demonstrate the potential level of specificity and tempo-
ral precision of stimulations that may be necessary to induce very specific
patterns of responses, thus addressing the second, pragmatic limitation high-
lighted above.
Essentially the same optogenetic techniques were used by Deiserroth
group[20], which led to driving a rodent’s response in a way not dependent on
its willful behaviours or conditioning. The freely moving mouse exploring its
surroundings started to move in a very unnatural way, turning consistently
left-wise upon commencement of optical stimulation of the right motor cor-
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tex. The behaviour returned to normal willful exploratory behaviour as soon
as the stimulation was turned off13.
5.1 From intuition pump to physical realisation of
thought experiment
Experiments such as the ones reported above, although conducted with com-
pletely different and legitimate research questions in mind, open up a possi-
bility of creating a zombie mouse, in which its behaviour is based on mecha-
nistically developed patterns of activations of brain structures and not related
to animal wilful behaviour or conscious perception, as attested by the stark
contrast between the artificial behaviour of the animal while under the stim-
ulation and when it is freely behaving (the stimulation is off).
In principle, such optogenetic techniques can be used to deliver very pre-
cise control of neural structures in real time with millisecond precision and
in closed loop fashion, where optical control is a function of observed neural
activity and the resultant behaviours; for example, in conditioning experi-
ments such as those performed by Potter’s group on neural cultures[1]. They
could be used to achieve desired behaviours in animats or indeed in animals,
where the associated patterns of activity need not rely on animal wilful be-
haviour, thus addressing the first, fundamental limitation mentioned above.
Thus, such an animal’s brain could be conditioned, upon pattern of activa-
tion corresponding to Chinese characters input, to go through a sequence of
neural activation patterns resulting in the little murine squeaking a perfectly
appropriate response in Chinese (well, not really, but it could produce instead
a sequence of lever presses corresponding to such a response)14.
However, upon inspection of the behaviours of the Deiserroth mouse from
the experiments reported in[20], it seems obvious that they are alien to the
animal. There is nothing in the animal’s intrinsic makeup that would cause it
to behave in this way out of its own accord, and it is extremely unlikely that it
would ever acquire any intentionality of such externally imposed behaviours.
This is in spite of the fact that the creature would be equipped, by nature,
with perfect embodiment and, by experimenter, with artificial sensory-motor
couplings resulting in it experiencing the world consistent with induced ac-
tions. However, these induced couplings would not be the effect of the intrinsic
animal needs (metabolic or otherwise) at any level; to the contrary, they are
the cause of metabolic demands. As the animal would be driven, this would
cause sequences of sensory-motor couplings, hence it would be the experi-
menter that would drive these metabolic demands in an arbitrary way (from
13 See movies of experimental animal at www.youtube.com/watch?v=88TVQZUfYGw
14 Selmer Bringsjord proposed a thought experiment surgery on Searle in[6] that was
similar in spirit to our zombie mouse; we believe though that at the end of both exper-
iments our zombie mouse would be better off than Searle.
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the perspective of metabolic needs of animal or its cellular constituents) thus
the casual relationship between the bodily milieu and the motor actions and
sensory readings would be disrupted. However, it is the right type of such
couplings and their directionality that ultimately leads to intentionality ac-
cording the enactive approach.
Hence we do not expect that such a ‘zombie mouse’ would acquire any form
of understanding of the presented Chinese story. A fortiori, if such formal rule-
book following does not lead a sentient being to acquire an understanding,
we do not expect that the analogously trained animat with its impoverished
envatment for a body, will be any luckier in this respect.
6 Conclusions
This paper argued that neither zombie mice nor animats will escape Searle’s
CRA, which we suggest continues to have force against claims of their symbol-
grounding, understanding and intentionality.
Similar objections towards embodied AI have been put forward in[18, 19],
however, their discussion is limited to traditional robotic systems. Our paper
extends this line of argument towards hybrid systems, or even systems with
fully functional body, which are driven by formal computational rules.
A zombie mouse was used as a vehicle for demonstrating that it is not a
‘trivial’ matter of providing an appropriate embodiment for effectively Tur-
ing Machine style operations that could account for emergence of meaning,
grounding and teleology. Furthermore, we believe our zombie mouse argu-
ment also demonstrates that if the mechanistic account is not consistent
with the low level embodiment (as was the case for zombie mouse - the infor-
mation processing imposed on it is external and arbitrary with respect to the
properties of the ‘machinery’ [the brain and the organism] in which it is im-
plemented), then the result is exactly that - a zombie - with no understanding
or ownership of the actions imposed on it.
We suggest that what body provides goes over and above what robotic/artificial
embodiments can offer: in the right conditions both the natural body and ar-
tificial embodiments are a source of correlations of activations of different
brain areas caused by different dimensions of real objects/world. As we tried
to articulate in this paper, such correlations are important, they may be even
necessary, but they do not seem to be sufficient for meaning to arise and this
seems to hold true as much for fully artificial system as for those that blend
the artificial and biological components.
Finally, we do not wish to appear as providing a wholesale criticism of cog-
nitive robotics. Indeed, we believe that this area offers very fertile grounds for
creating experimental platforms for testing information processing aspects of
embodied cognitive processing[32]. However, we do remain sceptical whether
such systems or their hybrid mechano-biological extensions of late, driven by
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mechanical formal computational rules are able to answer the most funda-
mental questions about the nature of intelligence and cognition. In order to
achieve such a breakthrough the embodied systems yet to be developed will
have to seriously take the body into account.
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